

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BELGRA 06122 171524Z

11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 048902

R 171301Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8095
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T BELGRADE 6122

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR NATO YO
SUBJ: YUGOSLAVIA AND NATO

REF: (A) USNATO 4942, (B) BELGRADE 6058 (NOTAL),
(C) BELGRADE 2522

1. STRONGLY AGREE WITH MY COLLEAGUE STRAUSSZ-HUPE THAT NATO MUST CONSULT REGULARLY AND INTENSIVELY ABOUT YUGOSLAVIA. FRENCH AND ITALIAN OBJECTIONS SILLY. AS YUGOSLAVS KNOW OF PAST NATO TALKS, THEY WOULD BE TROUBLED TO LEARN ALLIANCE HAD LOST INTEREST. AND SENIOR FSFA OFFICIAL HIMSELF PROVIDED JUSTIFICATION (AND BEST REBUTTAL TO ANY FOR-THE-RECORD OBJECTIONS THEY PREDICTABLY WOULD MAKE SHOULD CONSULTATIONS BECOME PUBLIC) WHEN HE REMARKED TO TWO OTHER NATO AMBASSADORS AND TO ME (IN THE AFTERMATH OF SONNENFELDT FLAP) THAT SHOULD YUGOSLAVIA BE INVADED IT WOULD BE AN ILLUSION TO EXPECT THAT CERTAIN COUNTRIES COULD SIT BACK AND "CHEER ON THE HEROIC YUGOSLAVS" LIKE ACTORS ON A STAGE. HE CLAIMED THAT YUGOSLAVS WOULD INSURE THAT ANY INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA WOULD CAUSE A FULL-SCALE EUROPEAN WAR (PEF REF C.)

2. REAL ISSUE IS NOT WHETHER WE SHOULD HAVE CONSULTATIONS BUT WHAT SHOULD BE THEIR GOAL. INFORMATION EXCHANGE IS DESIRABLE AND FOR OUR PART WE WILL CONTINUE TO INCLUDE USNATO ON SIGNIFICANT CABLES. BUT CLEARLY CENTRAL ISSUE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BELGRA 06122 171524Z

IS WHAT WE SHOULD DO TO SUSTAIN AND INCREASE YUGOSLAV

INDEPENDENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHILE REDUCING DAMAGE
YUGOSLAVS DO THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES IN WESTERN
EUROPE AND REST OF WORLD.

2. AS REF B AND PREVIOUS HAVE MADE CLEAR, WE BELIEVE
REPEATED OPEN-ENDED AND SEEMINGLY NERVOUS STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT
FOR YUGOSLAVIA EITHER ADDRESSED TO SOVIET UNION OR YUGOSLAVS
THEMSELVES ARE DISTINCTLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. THEY WILL BE TAKEN
MORE AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS THAN STRENGTH. TITO AND SOME OTHER
YUGOSLAV LEADERS BEGINNING TO BELIEVE WEST IS IN EARLY
STAGES OF DECLINE, AND THINK THAT WHILE OUR "REACTIONARY
FORCES" STILL REPRESENT A THREAT TO THEM, ON THE WHOLE THE
WEST CAN BE SIMULTANEOUSLY TAKEN FOR GRANTED AND NOT RELIED
UPON (A CONFIDENTIAL YUGOSLAV STUDY RECENTLY NOTED WITH
RELIEF THAT US STANCE TOWARD SOVIET UNION GROWING TOUGHER
AND THAT THIS WAS IN YUGOSLAVIA'S INTEREST). OUR RESPONSE
SHOULD BE ONE OF FIRMNESS TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA (AS WELL
AS SOVIET UNION), COMBINED WITH WILLINGNESS TO DEVELOP
RELATIONS ON BASIS OF MUTUAL INTEREST -- PARTICULARLY
IN THE MILITARY FIELD.

3. IF THE WEST COULD JOIN TOGETHER ON SUCH AN APPROACH
THERE WOULD BE FAR LESS BILATERAL TURBULENCE THAN THERE
HAS BEEN IN RECENT MONTHS (THE GERMANS, AUSTRIANS, FRENCH
AND OURSELVES HAVE ALL BEEN THROUGH OR ARE STILL UNDER-
GOING STRAINS DUE CHIEFLY TO YUGOSLAV BELIEF IN THE
EFFICACY OF PRESSURE AND DIVIDE AND CONQUER). CHIEF
PROBLEM WITH THE BE-NICE-TO-THE-YUGOSLAVS
APPROACH IS THAT IT HAS LED YUGOSLAVIA TO MISCALCULATE
HOW FAR THEY CAN PUSH US WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
INEVITABLE AND JUSTIFIABLE DOMESTIC POLITICAL REACTIONS
INSIDE EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES -- LATEST EXAMPLES ARE
CARLOS, BITTER FIGHT WITH AUSTRIA, AND TOTH CASE. RESULT
IS PUBLIC IN WEST NOT PREPARED TO SACRIFICE MUCH FOR
YUGOSLAVS' SAKE. AND AS VIETNAM AND ANGOLA DEMONSTRATED,
UNLESS OUR ALLIES IN THE REGION ARE WILLING TO HELP DEFEND A
COUNTRY, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND PUBLIC ARE CERTAINLY
NOT WILLING TO DO SO. OUR ACTIONS FOR OR AGAINST YUGOSLAVS ARE
INEXTRICABLY LINKED TO YUGOSLAV ACTIONS VIS-A-VIS ISSUES OF
CONCERN TO US. THEY MUST ABOVE ALL BE BROUGHT TO RESPECT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BELGRA 06122 171524Z

THE WEST AT LEAST AS MUCH AS THEY DO THE EAST, IF THEY ARE
TO SUSTAIN THE WILL TO RESIST THE SOVIET UNION AND WE
ARE TO DEVELOP A GREATER WILL TO HELP.
SILBERMAN

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ORGS, BRIEFINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 17 SEP 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: coburnhl
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976BELGRA06122
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760353-0113
From: BELGRADE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760951/aaaabqzf.tel
Line Count: 111
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 76 BELGRADE 6058, 76 BELGRADE 2522
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: coburnhl
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <07 APR 2004 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <29 JUL 2004 by coburnhl>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: YUGOSLAVIA AND NATO
TAGS: PFOR, YO, US, NATO
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006